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Abstract
two studios were conducted to explore the question of whether 
the feelings-as-information hypothesis can be applied to the 
effects of state and trait anxiety upon judgments of risk. 
Undergraduate students made judgments of the likelihood that 
certain negative events would occur in the near future and 
completed measures of trait and state anxiety. Subjects were 
divided into 3 groups, in which an important exam was made 
either highly salient, moderately salient, or was not made 
salient. Study 1 found a relation between trait anxiety and 
risk, but not for state anxiety and risk. Also study 1 
failed to find the predicted interaction between the salience 
of the exam ar.d judgments of risk. However, a second, 
modified study did find evidence for the predicted effects.
In the second study, high state anxious subjects gave higher 
risk estimates, but when the source of their anxiety was made 
highly salient, they gave lower predictions of risk. These 
results support the feelings-as-information hypothesis.
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2Previous research has suggested that transient affective 
states tend to distort evaluative judgments in the same 
direction as the hedonic tone of that state. These mood 
congruence effects have been found in such areas as life 
satisfaction (SchwaLZ and Clore, 1983; Schwarz. Strack,
Kommer and Wagner, 1987), control (Abramson and Alloy, 1981), 
tisk (Beck, 1986; Butler and Mathews, 1987; Johnson and 
Tversky, 1983), political issues (Porgas and Moylan, 1985), 
humor appreciation (Cantor, Bryant, and Zillmann, 1974) and 
consumer decision making (Isen and Means, 1983).
Different explanations have been invoked to explain the 
effects of mood on judgement. Investigators such as Bower 
(1981, 1983) and Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978) favoi 
a theory based on construct accessibility. Another group of 
investigators, Schwarz and Clore (1983,1988), has proposed 
that mood serves to inform the person of their attitude 
toward the stimulus to be judged. This perspective is often 
referred to as the feelings-as * information hypothesis. Some 
recent research focuses on the effects of specific emotions 
such as anxiety on evaluative judgments (Butler and Mathews, 
1987; Simpson-Hous 1 ey, De Man, S. Yachnin, 1986). Our 
objective is to demonstrate how the feelings-as-information 
hypothesis might be extended to explain these effects.
Construct Accessibility
One of the most frequently cited explanation of mood
Introduction
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effects on judgments is based on construct accessibility.
This explanation proposes that mood causes mood-congruent 
concepts to be more accessible in working memory thereby 
potentially distorting one's interpretation of external 
situations. Bower (1981) proposed that the process by which 
this occurs is similar to that of semantic network theory 
(Anderson and Bower, 1973; Collins and Quillian, 1978). 
Semantic network theory likens long term memory to a network 
of concepts or nodes. These concepts are linked together by 
associations. When a concept is activated, the activation is 
thought to spread along associative pathways thereby making 
related concepts more accessible. Bower assumed that 
distinct emotions are each represented as nodes in memory 
which are linked to concepts associated with that emotion. 
When the emotion is activated by an eliciting event, 
activation spreads along associative pathways to these 
concepts and thus primes this information. Because this 
information is more accessible to the person than non-mood 
congruent concepts, it leads to a biased interpretation of 
the situation and thus a biased evaluation of the situation.
Evidence of an effect of primed information on 
subsequent judgments was found in a study done by Higgins, 
Rholes, and Jones (1977). Subjects completed a Stroop task 
in which words were printed in colors and subjects were to 
name the colors and ignore the words, a task that served to 
prime certain personality traits for use in interpreting an
ambiguous description of a person. They were then asked to 
evaluate an ambiguous passage about a person named Donald.
The results showed that subjects' evaluations of Donald were 
consistent with the evaluative implications of the traits 
that were primed in the first part of the experiment.
Fee1ing3 -AS -Infa rmi t| on
Another explanation for the distorting effects of mood 
on evaluative judgments has been proposed by Schwarz and 
Clore (1983, 1988). They argue that, rather than mood 
serving as a stimulus which primes mood-congruent 
information, there is a more direct link between a person's 
mood and it's effects on evaluative judgments. When people 
are asked to make an affective judgment about a stimulus, 
they often rely on their affective cues. They interpret 
their feelings as an indication of their attitude toward the 
object or event in question. In other words, they 
misattribute their feelings, which are a product of their 
transient mood, as being an indication of their attitude 
towards the external stimulus. For example, suppose for a 
moment that a person went on a date with someone for the 
first time, saw the person's favorite group in concert, and 
had a magnificent time. Later, as the person tried to decide 
how he or she felt about the date,perhaps positive feelings 
might be experienced that stemmed from the concert. These 
might be misread as being an indication of strong liking of 
the date. This is not to say that part cf the mood was not
4
5induced by the date's witty conversation, it might very well 
have been. According to the feelings-as-information 
hypothesis, the relevant and irrelevant sources of the mood, 
the great concert or the charming companion, are not as 
important as how one attributes the source of the mood. As 
long as one attributes the mood as coming from the stimulus 
to be judged, mood congruent effects will occur.
Similarities and Differences Between Other Theories
The feelings-as information hypothesis might sound 
reminiscent of other ideas such as of Schachter and Singer's 
theory of emotion (1962) or the later excitation transfer 
theory of Zillman (1971,1972). There are, however, a few 
important differences.
Schachter and Singer hypothesized that people experience 
physiological arousal but are not always cognizant of the 
source of that arousal. When given certain external cues in 
the environment, people often misattribute their arousal as 
being indicative of an emotional response. In their classic 
experiment Schachter and Singer (1962) were able to show that 
subjects given epinephrine would report either euphoria or 
anger depending upon whether they were exposed to a stooge 
who was acting in an euphoric or angry fashion.
Zillman (1971,1972) applied this idea to evaluative 
judgments. He suggested that when people are asked to make a 
judgment they misattribute or transfer their arousal to the 
stimulus object to be judged. In one experiment (Zillman,
1984) he had subjects read either positive, negative or 
neutral passages and then measured their appreciation of 
humorous passages. He found that people who read arousing 
passages, regardless of the hedonic tone of the passage, 
tended to rate the anecdotes as more humorous.
The feelings-as- information hypothesis is similar in 
that it states that people sometimes misattribute the source 
of their feelings. There are, however, a few important 
differences. First, unlike Schachter and Singer, proponents 
of the feelings-as-information hypothesis do not 
conceptualize emotion as generic arousal. Second, unlike 
Ziilmann's excitation transfer theory, they propose that the 
hedonic tone of the mood induction task is relevant, and that 
mood and emotions themselves, not just arousal may be 
misattributed.
Feelings as a Judgment Heuristic
Schwarz and Clore (1988) speculated that people rely on 
their feelings in order to simplify what would otherwise be a 
complex cognitive endeavor. The information that people 
glean from their feelings acts somewhat like a short cut or 
judgment heuristic. Consider for a moment the types of 
judgments subjects in mood induction studies have been asked 
to make: life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), choice 
of cars to purchase (Isen and Means, 1983), and their stance 
on various political issues (Forgas and Mylan, 1985) to name 
but a few. These are complicated judgments to make at a
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moments notice in a brief experimental session. Schwarz and 
Clore suggested that instead of systematically analyzing all 
available data, which might be nebulous in the case of life 
satisfaction or scarce in the case of deciding which car to 
purchase, people implicitly ask themselves, MHow Do I Feel 
About It?'*
Evidence in J£avor oijthe Feelings-ag-Information Hypothesis 
A variety of laboratory observations demonstrate that 
the feelings-as-information hypothesis is a more viable 
explanation for mood congruence effects than are theories 
based on construct accessibility. Among those of primary 
importance are the following: (1) Manipulating the
informative value of the person's feelings can disrupt the 
observed mood congruence effects (Schwarz and Clore, 1983),
(2) The priming hypothesis predicts that mood congruent 
effects are more likely to occur when the content of the mood 
induction is similar to the content of the judgment, but 
Clore, Schwarz and Kirsch (1983) found that mood effects were 
not influenced by the nonaffective content of the mood, and
(3) the priming hypothesis predicts that the effect of mood 
will depend on the persons' affective state at the time of 
encoding, but Clore, Parrott, and Wilkin, (1987) found that 
mood effects occur at the time of judgment. Each of these 
studies will be discussed in more detail below. They should 
not be interpreted as proof that priming effects do not 
occur, but rather that priming is not sufficient to explain
8the effects mood has on evaluative judgment.
The informational value of one’s mood.
The first piece of evidence that favors the feelings-as- 
information hypothesis concerns the perception that affective 
cues are relevant to the judgment at hand. The priming 
hypothesis maintains that mood has a specific node in 
semantic memory. When primed, activation spreads out to 
associated concepts, thus activating mood congruent concepts 
and coloring the perception of ambiguous external stimuli.
As Clore and Parrot (1991. p. 6) pointed out, "there is no a 
priori reason to assume that such automatic and unconscious 
processes should depend on the subject’s conscious 
attributions about their momentary affective experience.
And yet groundbreaking work by Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
illustrates that the attributions about the source of their 
mood does in fact determine whether or not mood congruent 
effects occur.
In their first experiment, Schwarz and Clore had 
subjects recall either positive or negative past life events 
in order to induce the appropriate mood. Some subjects were 
led to believe that the experimental room (which was small 
and sound-proof) might make them feel tense. All subjects 
were then asked to complete a life-satisfaction 
questionnaire. As a result, unlike the other subjects in a 
bad mood, subjects who were led to misattribute their bad 
mood to the experimental room reported the same level of
91 ife-satisfaction as the subjects in a good mood.
In a second study, the investigators randomly telephoned 
people on either rainy or sunny days. In order to lead 
subjects to attribute their mood to an external source, the 
investigators asked about the weather at the beginning of the 
conversation (under the guise of calling from out of town). 
They found that there was no difference in the life- 
satisfaction scores of subjects on sunny or rainy days when 
the subjects were led to attribute their mood to the weather.
These two studies show that when asked to make an 
evaluative judgment, people sometimes rely upon their 
momentary feelings as information. As a result, their 
judgments match the hedonic tone of their mood. If, however, 
subjects do not perceive their feelings as a reaction to the 
object at hand but rather as due to some transient external 
source, like the weather or an uncomfortable experimental 
room, these mood effects will not occur. Under those 
circumstances, people, aware that their feelings are not 
informative, are forced to evaluate the stimulus in a more 
systematic fashion.
The ...cognitive conJ.ent of mood induct iontasks.
According to priming theories, not only does mood 
activate mood congruent concepts, but the content of the 
induction activates related concepts as well. As a result, 
since these concepts are more accessible, one would expect to 
see more pronounced mood effects when the judgment is similar
10
in content to that of the induction. An example of this 
would be that if one were in a good mood because of a 
satisfying meal one had just consumed, then one might judge 
different types of food more favorably than different types 
of cars. The feelings as information hypothesis, on the 
other hand, would predict that one would evaluate each area 
equally favorably provided, of course, one did not realize 
that the feeling was solely due to the meal. In that case, 
one's judgments of cars and other unrelated stimuli would not 
be distorted by mood.
Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that the content of the 
mood induction task affected evaluative judgments equally 
regardless of the content of the judgments. In that study, 
subject read accounts of patients with cancer. Subsequently, 
they were asked to make judgments concerning the risk that 
certain negative events would occur. The researchers found 
that evaluation of all of the events, including the risks of 
divorce, accidents, and cancer were equally affected by 
subjects' mood.
Another study, by Clore, Schwarz and Kirch (1983) also 
failed to find an effect for nonaffective priming along with 
mood effects when the congruence of the content of the 
induction and the judgment was varied. These investigators 
used hypnosis to induce positive or negative moods. Highly 
susceptible subjects were hypnotized and given a fantasy 
theme either about a pleasant or an unpleasant date (an
11
interpersonal theme) or a pleasant or unpleasant vacation (a 
noninterperi, ual theme). The subjects then read passages 
either about another person or about a vacation, and were 
asked to evaluate the desirability of the person or vacation. 
Each passage included ambiguous sentences which could be 
interpreted favorably of unfavorably depending upon the 
subject's mood. Mood congruent models would predict that if 
the content of the mood inducti on matched the content of the 
judgment, that category would be the most accessible, 
resulting in an effect for similarity of theme and content as 
well as of mood. No such effects were obtained. Subjects in 
a positive mood evaluated both the person and vacation more 
favorably regardless of which fantasy induced their mood.
Both of these studies (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Ciore, 
Schwarz, & Kirsch, 1983) failed to find evidence that mood 
effects on judgment depend on the cognitive content of the 
mood induction. The fact that there were mood effects but no 
evidence of nonmood priming, suggests that priming may not 
have been involved in the mood effect either. Rather they 
suggest that, because the source of their feelings was not 
salient, subjects perceived their feelings as being a product 
of the stimulus they were to judge. These studies lend 
further credence to the mood-as-information hypothesis.
State dependent retrieval.
The third reason why the investigators believe that the 
feelings-as-information hypothesis is more consistent with
the available data has to do with state dependent memory 
(Bower, 1981). According to semantic network theory, if the 
mood at the time of encoding new information is congruent 
with the mood at the time of recall, then the recall of this 
information should be enhanced. With respect to the effect 
of mood on evaluative judgment, this information should also 
be more accessible, thus resulting in mood biased judgments. 
The feelings-as-information hypothesis, on the other hand, 
predicts that mood should affect judgment equally, 
irrespective of the mood at encoding.
Clore, Parrott and Wilkin (1987) examined this 
relationship between mood at encoding and mood at recall, and 
its subsequent effect on judgment. Through the use of 
hypnosis, the investigators induced subjects into a positive 
or negative mood and had them read an evaluatively ambiguous 
description of a person. The investigators then repeated the 
hypnosis procedure and changed subjects' moods, a procedure 
that resulted in a 2x2 design crossing mood at encoding to 
mood at time of judgment. Finally, the subjects reported how 
well the traits characterized the person along a five-point 
scale. According to Bower (1981), subjects whose mood at 
encoding matched their mood at recall and judgment should 
have rated the person more positively if in a good mood and 
more negatively if in a bad mood. These effects were not 
found. Judgments were solely a function of mood at the time 
of the judgment.
12
The studies mentioned above demonstrate that the 
following holds true in the relationship between mood and 
evaluative judgments: first, if subjects are lead to believe
that their affective cues are not relevant to the judgment, 
mood affects will not occur; second, if the content of the 
mood induction matches the content of the judgment, the mood 
will distort judgment in the same degree as if the content 
did not match; third, mood affects are the result ot mood at 
the time of judgment, rather than solely at the time of 
encoding, ^hese finding are not consistent with predictions 
of construct accessibility models. Can we then conclude that 
priming does not occur when one is in a certain mood? Clore 
and Parrot (1991) do not deny the existence of priming 
effects nor even that they are irrelevant to distortions in 
judgments. They suggest that these theories focus on 
different parts of the same process. According to the 
feelings-as-information perspective, the affective cues upon 
which a person relies in order to make their judgments 
comprise both mood-based feelings and mood-based thoughts.
It is reasonable to assume that mood-based thoughts are made 
more accessible through priming, but whether these thoughts 
influence judgment depends on the same factors as whether 
feelings influence judgment - on what information they 
provide the subject about his or her reaction to the object 
of judgment. Priming effects therefore also depend on 
misattribution processes.
13
14
State and Trait Anxiety
The studies discussed up to this point have concentrated 
on the effects of transient mood on evaluative judgment.
Very few investigators have looked at how specific emotions, 
such as anxiety, depression, or anger, affect evaluative 
judgment;. Specific emotions differ from mood in a few 
fundamental ways. For example, specific emotions tend to be 
more acute and shorter in duration than moods. Emotions also 
tend to have more cognitive content. As a result of these 
differences, the causes of specific emotions tend to be more- 
salient than the causes of moods (Gallagher and Clore, 1985). 
Therefore, it is assumed that, emotions would affect judgment 
only in so far as the judgment is relevant to the emotion. 
Gallagher and Clore (1985) did a study which verified this 
assumption. They hypnotically induced subjects to feel 
either anger or fear. They then had subjects make a series 
of judgments on how blameworthy a person was or how likely it 
was that a certain negative event would occur. The 
investigators found that angry subjects made a greater number 
of evaluations of blame than fearful subjects and that the 
fearful subjects made higher predictions of risk than angry 
subjects. This study illustrates that while specific 
emotions affect judgment, they do so only as long as the 
judgment is relevant to the emotion.
Not only have the studies discussed thus far dealt with 
moods rather than emotion, all of them, including the one
15
just mentioned, have looked at affective states as opposed to 
affective traits. An affective trait is similar to an 
affective state except that it is not a transient feeling but 
rather it is thought to be a stable part of one's 
personality. The idea is that the system responsible for 
causing an experience of a particular emotion is chronically 
activated. A person who is high in a specific affective 
trait is assumed to have a propensity to experience this 
emotion frequently because it is more or less continuously 
activated. The heightened activation could come about either 
as a result of biological differences in temperament (Gray, 
1971) or because of chronic cognitive concerns that elicit 
the emotion (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988).
A study by Butler and Mathews (1987) looked at the how 
trait anxiety and state anxiety influence judgment. They 
used tin ee groups of subjects: those who were about to take
an important exam and were thus high in state anxiety, those 
high in trait anxiety, and normal controls. All subjects 
were given a questionnaire in which they were to evaluate the 
likelihood that certain events would occur. The questions 
differed in whether they were related to academic achievement 
or other more general activities. The researchers found that 
subjects high in state anxiety tended to rate academic 
failure as more likely to occur than did normal controls. 
Subjects high in trait anxiety also rated failure in other 
areas as more likely to occur. Butler and Mathews
16
interpreted these results as evidence that schemas play an 
important part in making evaluative judgments. Negative exam 
related thoughts were more accessible to subjects high in 
state anxiety. Because this exam anxiety schema was salient 
to them, it influenced their evaluation of exam related 
events. Feople high in trait anxiety, on the other hand, had 
an anxiety schema that was wider in breadth and therefore 
influenced their judgments on a wider range of stimuli.
We propose an alternative explanation. Namely, that the 
results found by Butler and Mathews might be explained by the 
feelings-as-information hypothesis. We suggest that what is 
most important is not the heightened availability of 
pessimistic concepts for interpreting events, but rather, the 
feedback that danger is present provided by their current 
emotional experience (which includes anxious thoughts, 
feelings, and physical sensations), and the perception that 
this feedback is their reaction to the stimuli that is to be 
judged. On the basis of these considerations, several 
hypotheses were formed. The first was that trait anxiety 
would affect judgments of risk. It was expected that this 
biased perception of risk would be greater for personal than 
impersonal risks, and that the effect of trait anxiety would 
depend on state anxiety as the mediating factor. Finally, it 
was hypothesized that making a temporary external source of 
anxiety salient would eliminate the effects of anxiety on 
risk perception. If this is the case, we would expect that
if we lead people who are experiencing trait or state 
anxiety to attribute their anxiety to a specific external 
source, such as a major up-coming exam, it would decrease 
their estimation of risk on personal, non-exam related items. 
To test this hypothesis we conducted two studies. In both 
studies we tested people who were experiencing state anxiety, 
trait anxiety or neither. As in the study of by Butler and 
Mathews, subjects were given a subjective probability of risk 
questionnaire. Some subjects, however were lead to believe 
that their anxious feeling were entirely a product of a major 
exam that they were about to take.
Experiment 1 
Methods
Subjects
71 subjects participated in this study. 37 of them were 
male and 34 >f them were female. 48 of them were in one of 
the two experimental groups, the experimental attribution 
condition or the experimental no attribution condition.
These subjects were all scheduled to take either the L-Sat, 
M-Cat, or ORE exam within a week of the experiment.
Potential subjects were contacted through the Stanley Kaplan 
preparation center. Subjects completed a form that gave 
their phone number and expressed their desire to participate 
in our study.
The remaining 23 subjects were assigned to the control 
group. Subjects in this condition had previously completed
17
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their entrance exams. They were randomly selected from a 
list of pre-law seniors enrolled at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. The admissions secretary 
supplied this list of students.
Materials
'here were three questionnaires to which all subjects 
were asked to respond. The first was a set of questions 
about the probability that a certain negative event would 
occur in the near future. This questionnaire contained 3 
sets of 3 questions each (see appendix A). The first set of 
questions was concerned with nonpersonal events. For 
example, one of the items was "Based on how you feel about it 
right now, what is the likelihood that a serious 
environmental catastrophe will occur soon in the U.S.?" The 
second set contained questions regarding personal, non- 
academic events. An example of such an item was "What is the 
probability that you will experience problems with a close 
friend or partner?" The final 3 items asked about personal 
academic related events. One such items was, "What is the 
likelihood that you will be unable to pursue your chosen 
profession?" These items were placed at the end so that the 
professional exams would not be salient to the experimental 
no-attribution group. For each of the 9 items, subjects were 
asked to respond on a 0-10 scale.
Subjects were also given the trait anxiety sub-scale of 
the Easi-Ill temperament survey (Buss & Plomin, 1975). The
19
final questionnaire assessed state anxiety. Subjects were 
asked to respond either true, probably true, probably not 
true or not true to the statements "Today I feel anxious.” 
and ”1 feel worried today."
Procedures
The experimental attribution group consisted of subjects 
who were about to take one of the 3 exams and were lead to 
attribute their anxiety entirely to the exam. Subjects in 
the experimental no attribution group were also about to take 
one of the exams, but their attribution about the cause of 
their anxiety was not manipulated. Members of the control 
group were not about to take any major exams and did not 
receive an attribution manipulation. The two experimental 
groups were telephoned one week before the exam they were 
scheduled to take, and the control groups were called one 
week after all of the experimental subjects were contacted.
The experimental attribution group was told that the 
purpose of the research was to study exam anxiety. These 
subjects were told that many people become anxious before the 
exams. They were then asked a series of true-false 
questions about their feelings toward the impending exam.
The purpose of the questions was to make the exam very 
salient as a cause of anxious feelings. Subjects in the 
experimental no attribution group were not told what the 
study was about. They were, however, asked when they were 
going to take the exam and if they thought it was going to be
20
difficult. The purpose of these minimal questions was to 
remind subjects of the exam to induce anxiety but not to make 
the exam extremely salient. Members of the control group 
were simply told that research was being done using pre-law 
students as subjects. All subjects were then asked to rate 
the probability that certain negative events would occur.
They were also asked the questions assessing trait and state 
anxiety.
Results
Subjects scoring between 0 and 2 on the measure for 
state anxiety were classified as low in state anxiety; those 
who scored between 3 and 6 were classified as high in state 
anxiety. For trait anxiety, subjects scoring between 0 and 7 
were categorized as low in trait anxiety and those scoring 
between 7 and 15 were categorized as high in trait anxiety 
These cutoffs were determined by using the mean of the 
distribution of scores for each measure. The mean scores of 
subjects in each condition is reported in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
Separate analyses were performed for each of the three 
types of risk items. The design was a 2x2x3 analysis of 
variance using gender, trait anxiety, and experimental 
condition as the independent variables and risk items as the 
dependent variables. No significant main effects or
21
interactions were found for any of the different types of 
risk items.
In order to equate the three groups on state anxiety, an 
analysis of covariance with state anxiety covaried out using 
gender, anxiety temperament, experimental condition as the 
independent variables and risk items as the dependent 
variable was performed. There was a significant effect for 
trait anxiety on the personal risk items. Subjects low in 
trait anxiety had lower estimates of risk (M = 11. 76) than 
subjects high in trait anxiety (M = 14.21), F (1,5’M  - 3.78, 
p < .057.
An analysis of variance was performed using the initial 
experimental design but substituting state anxiety for trait 
anxiety. Again, no significant main effects or interactions 
were found for any of the three types of risk items.
Discussion
The results of this experiment ind cated that trait 
anxiety influenced judgments of risk whereas state anxiety 
did not. It is possible that as a result* of their enrollment 
in test preparation courses, subject's in the two 
experimental conditions were not anxious about their 
impending professional exams. This may explain why the 
predicted effects for state anxiety were not found.
This experiment also failed to find the predicted 
interaction between anxiety and level of attribution. Even 
though subjects in the experimental no attribution condition
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were not asked questions about exam anxiety, they were asked 
when they were going to take the exam and if they felt it was 
going to be difficult. It is possible that these two 
questions were sufficient to cause subjects in this condition 
to attribute their feelings of anxiety to the upcoming exam. 
If this is the case, it might explain why an interaction 
between anxiety and level of attribution was not found.
Another potential problem with this study was the number 
of items used to assess subjects' perceptions of risk. The 
subjective probability questionnaire used by Butler and 
Mathews (1987) contained forty-eight items. The 
questionnaire used in the present study, on the other hand, 
contained only nine items, only three of which were relevant 
to personal risk. Such an abbreviated measure, used because 
of the difficulties in administering a more extensive 
questionnaire over the phone, may have reduced the power of 
the study.
It appears that this experiment may have failed to find 
an influence of state anxiety upon judgment because of the 
nature of the sample tested and the number of questions used 
to evaluate subjects' perception of risk. Furthermore, it 
was thought that the questions subjects in the experimental 
no attribution condition were asked to remind them of the 
exam may have caused them to attribute their feelings of 
anxiety to the exam they were about to take. Therefore, a 
second experiment was run that tested a sample of people
thought to be higher in state anxiety, that employed more 
personal risk items, and that included a condition in which 
the exam was not salient to the subjects at ail.
Experiment 2 
Methods
Subjects
Students from an undergraduate personality psychology 
course at the University of Illinois were asked to fill out 2 
different questionnaires on separate occasions. Subjects who 
only completed time 1 data were eliminated from the subject 
pool. 103 subjects completed both time 1 and time 2 data.
55 of them were female and 48 of them were male. 43 
completed only time 2 data. of those, 23 were female and 20 
were male. Subjects were given the first set of 
questionnaires 2 weeks before finals and the second set 1 
week before finals.
Materials
The questionnaire handed out on the first day was a 
measure of trait anxiety, identical to the one used in study 
1. On the second day, a packet containing three sections was 
handed out. The first section contained the attribution, 
semi-attribution or no attribution manipulation. The second 
section contained questions on subjective probabilities of 
risk (see Appendix B). This questionnaire differed from the 
one used in study 1. It contained 9 personal items, 1 exam 
related item and 1 nonpersonal item (see Appendix C). The
23
final section evaluated state anxiety. Again, this measure 
was identical to that of the first study.
Procedures
On the first day, the Easi-Ill temperament survey (Buss 
6 Plomin, 1975) was passed out to every student in class with 
instructions that completing the questionnaire was voluntary. 
For the second session students randomly received a packet 
with either an attribution, semi - attr1 but 1 on, or no 
attribution manipulation, a subjective probability of risk 
questionnaire, and a measure assessing state anxiety.
Result s
Subjects scoring between 0 and 4 on the measure for 
state anxiety were classified as low in state anxiety; those 
who scored between 5 and 8 were classified as high in state 
anxiety. For trait anxiety, subjects scoring between 2 and 9 
were categorized as low in trait anxiety and those scoring 
between 10 and 17 were categorized as high in trait anxiety 
As was the case in experiment 1, these cutoffs were 
determined by using the mean of the distribution of scores 
for each measure. The mean scores of subjects in each 
condition is reported in Table 1.
A 2x2x3 analysis of variance was performed using gender, 
state anxiety, and level of attribution as independent 
variables and estimation of risk as a dependent variable. As 
expected, there was an interaction between state anxiety and 
level of attribution, F ( 2,36) = 3,385, p<.G37. A Least
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Significant Difference post hoc test revealed that subjects 
high in state anxiety who did not have the exam made salient 
to them, or for whom it was made only moderately salient, 
gave higher estimations of risk (M ~ 38.00 and M - 39.70 
respectively) than subjects to whom the exam was highly 
salient (M * 31.52). Subjects lower in state anxiety to whom
the exam was not salient had higher estimations of risk (M = 
39.44) than subjects to whom the exam was moderately salient 
(M - 29.60). These results are summarized in Figure 1 and
Table 2.
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about here
A 2x2x3 analysis of variance was performed using gender, 
state anxiety, and attribution level as independent variables 
and state anxiety also as the dependent variable. This was 
analysis was done to discover whether the attribution 
manipulation increased subjects’ levels of state anxiety or 
changed subjects’ interpretations of the relevance of their 
anxious experience to the object of judgment. The analysis 
failed to reveal a significant interaction between state 
anxiety and attribution level. As figure 2 illustrates, the 
mean state anxiety scores of high and low state anxious 
subjects did not change as a result of the attribution 
manipulation.
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Insett Figure 2 about here
An item by item analysis was done on the personal risk 
questions. Item number 4. "How likely is it that an 
important appointment will slip yout mind?" showed the most 
dramatic effects, F(2,136)=4.098, p<.019. The majority of 
the items were not significant by themselves.
When trait anxiety was substituted for state anxiety in 
the analysis of variance, there was not a significant main 
effect for trait anxiety. Nor was there an interaction 
between trait anxiety and level of attribution. When personal 
risk items were analyzed separately, there was a close to 
significant main effect for trait anxiety on item number 9, 
"How likely is it that you wilt say something that seems 
uninformed?" Subjects high in trait anxiety had slightly 
higher estimates of risk (M = 5.12} than subjects low in 
trait anxiety (M = 4.05), F (1, 91) • 3.503, p < .064.
Correlations among the independent variables state 
anxiety, trait anxiety, level of attribution, and gender, 
revealed that state anxiety and trait anxiety were positively 
correlated, r ~ ,24, p < .05, and trait anxiety and level of 
attribution were negatively correlated r = -.2510, p < .05.
Because of the negative correlation between trait 
anxiety and level of attribution, an analysis of covariance 
was performed u-ing personal risk as the dependent variable,
level of attribution, and state anxiety as the independent 
variables and trait anxiety as the covariate. This analysis 
did not sigmficant1y alter the means found when an analysis 
of variance was performed using the same variables.
No significant main effects of either trait or state 
anxiety for the exam related or the nonpersonal risk items. 
Nor was there an interaction between anxiety by attribution 
level for these items.
Di scur.s i on
This experiment -Iimh . •* oi t t a t fhot high state anxious 
subjects who were not aware or only moderately aware of a 
potential source of their tee lings gave higher judgment, of 
risk on personal, non-exam related items than high state 
anxious subjects who were strongly aware of a potential 
source of their feelings. These findings suggest the 
explanation proposed by Butler and Mathews (1987: of why 
anxiety affects judgments of risk is insufficient. There are 
two reasons for this conclusion: (a) in their experiment,
they found that state anxiety affected only exam related risk 
items, and (b) a theory based on schemas would not predict 
that the subjects' attribution of the source of their 
feelings would affect judgments of risk.
According to Butler and Mathews, subjects anxious 
because of an upcoming exam should give elevated predictions 
of risk only on exam related items. The reason for this is 
that negative exam related thoughts are more accessible to
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them, whereas negative non-exam related thoughts would not 
be. Our experiment, however, found that subjects 
experiencing exam anxiety gave inflated predictions of risk 
for miscel1aneous, non-exam related items. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that subjects who are 
experiencing anxiety rely upon their feelings to make 
judgments so long as they are not aware of a source of the 
feelings that would invalidate their use. It is likely that 
the reason we did not find heightened predictions of risk on 
the exam-related item was because one item is not 
sufficiently reliable to assess these effects.
We found tint when final exams were salient to subjects 
high in state anxiety, they gave lower predictions of risk 
than high state anxious subjects who were not acutely aware 
of the impending exams. This finding is inconsistent with 
Butler and Mathews’ assumption that state or trait anxiety 
affects judgments of risk solely because anxious thoughts are 
more accessible to people experiencing these emotions. If 
that wete the case, manipulating one’s attribution of the 
source of their feelings would not be sufficient to disrupt 
these mood congruence effects. In fact, if anxiety-based 
thoughts were the sole determiner of whether anxiety 
distorted judgment, making final exams more salient should 
have increased predictions of risk on the exam-related items 
by increasing anxious thoughts one experiences regarding the
exam.
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Rather, we propose that people experiencing anxiety rely 
upon their momentary affective cues when making judgments of 
risk. If, however, they realize that their feelings are not 
pertinent to the event to be judged, they tend to evaluate 
the event in a more systematic fashion. It is important to 
note that this perspective does not dispute the role of 
anxiety-based thoughts in the distortion of judgment, but 
rather it suggests that a theory based on schemas is not 
comprehensive enough to explain the available data. As Clore 
and Parrot (1991) noted, it is possible that the feelings-as- 
information perspective and theories based on construct 
accessibility are just looking at different aspects of the 
same process. It is conceivable that people rely upon their 
entire affective experience when making judgments. This 
experience may include emotion-based thoughts, feelings and 
even feedback from expression or behavior.
General Discussion
Proponents of schema theory assert that state and trait 
anxiety affect judgments through the activation of schemas. 
Because of the nature of the thoughts related to them, the 
effects of the two types of anxiety are different. State 
anxiety leads to elevated risk estimates that are 
specifically related to the source of the anxiety. Trait 
anxiety, on the other hand, influences judgments of general 
risk estimates. Another possibility, however, is that a 
person high in trait anxiety has the propensity to experience
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state anxiety with little external cause. Consistent with 
the implications of the affect-as-information hypothesis, I 
believe what is important in reference to how anxiety affects 
judgments of risk is one’s current experience of anxiety.
This state may stem from a transient external source or from 
a habitual experience of the particular emotion, which is 
presumably the case with trait anxiety.
The assumption that any effects 01 trait anxiety on 
judgments of risk would be mediated by the effects of state 
anxiety seems to be supported by experiment 2, but not by 
experiment 1. In experiment 2, we found that state anxiety 
distorts judgments of risk as long as a potential source of 
that anxiety 13 not salient. We also found that although 
trait anxiety did not exert a detectable influence upon 
judgment, it was correlated with state anxiety. In 
experiment 1, on the other hand, trait anxiety influenced 
judgment, but state anxiety did not. It is possible that the 
results of experiment 1 are unreliable because of the smaller 
sample size and fewer number of personal •'isk items. Clearly 
more studies should by conducted before any definite 
conclusions can be made about the nature of trait anxiety and 
its effects on judgment.
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Table 1
ftean.Sco_r«s__.of state and.
Anxiety Conditions (Study
Trait Anxiety for 
1 and Study 2)
Low and High
Type of Anxiety
Condition Trait State
Study 1
Low 4.24 1.22
High 10.18 4.41
Study 2
Low 7.14 1 88
High 12.36 4.55
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Table 2
Mean Jailmates fqr Persona1 Ri s k Items of High and Lo»L_8tate 
Anxious Subjects in Ho, Semi^  and FiiU _A ttribution ConAitJpJli
Attribution level
State anxiety No Semi Pull
High 38.00* 39.70* 31.52k
Low 39.44* 29.60k 34.86*k
Note. Means having the same subscript are not significantly 
different at p < .05.
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Figure Caption
Figure l. • Mean personal risk estimates of subjects high and
low in state anxiety in no, medium, and high salience of 
final exams conditions.
Figuire 2. Mean state anxiety scores of subjects high and low 
in state anxiety in no, medium and high salience of final 
exams conditions.
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Subjective. *iob*biJitjr of Risk Questionnaire, Study 1
The first questions concern how likely you feel the 
following things are to happen in the near future. Answer on 
a 0 to 10 scale, 0 is extremely unlikely and 10 is extremely 
likely.
1. How likely does it seem to you right now that some 
serious environmental catastrophe will occur soon in 
the US?
?. How likely does it seem to you now that there will 
be renewed fighting between Iraq and the Allies in 
the Middle East?
3. How likely does it seem to you now that, there will 
be another outbreak of meningitis on campus this 
year?
4. How likely does it seem that you will have something 
of value stolen this year?
5. How likely does it seem that you will experience 
serious problems with a close friend or partner?
6. How likely does seem that you will experience an 
awkward or embarrassing social situation?
7. How likely does it seem that you will lose the 
chance to pursue your chosen profession?
8 . How likely does it seem that you will fail to get 
into the graduate or professional school of your 
choice?
9. How likely does it seem that you will do more poorly 
than you hope on an important exam?
Appendix A
Subjective Probability of Risk Questionnaire, Study 2
Appendix B
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Please consider the following events and indicate how 
likely they seem. Answer on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 ir. 
extremely unlikely and 10 is likely.
1. How likely does it seem that you will have something 
of value stolen this year?
2. How likely does it seem that you will experience 
serious problems with a close friend or partner?
3. How likely does seem that you will experience an 
awkward or embarrassing social situation?
4. How likely does it seem that an important 
appointment will slip your mind soon?
3. How likely does it seem that you will have serious 
conflict with parents over the holidays?
6. How likely does it seem that you will have an 
accident or serious car trouble soon?
7. How likely does it seem that you or someone you 
know will contract a sexually transmitted disease?
8. How likely does it seem that you friends and 
acquaintances will talk about you behind you back?
9. How likely does it seem that you will say something 
that seems uninformed to the people around you?
10. How likely does it seem that your grades will 
increase as a result of you final exam performance?
11. How likely does it seem that the national economy 
will do badly over the next 6 months?
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Attr i but i on Manxpul at i on 
No Salience Condition
The packet merely contained the subjective probability 
of risk questionnaire and measures of state anxiety.
Medium Salience Condition
The first page of the packet contained the following 
questions:
1. How many finals do you have next week?
2. How many papers do you have next week?
3. How many hourly exams do you have?
High Salience Condition
The first page of the packet contained the following 
questions:
Appendix C
1. T P When ! think about taking final exams 1 can 
detect feelings of tenseness, anxiety, or
nervousness,
2. T P I think any feelings of anxiety or concern I 
feel at the present come mainly from thinking 
about final exams.
3. T P Without final exams coming up, I would 
probably not feel tense or nervous right now.
